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Abstract 
The assassination of Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin provided the most vivid demonstration to 
date of religious-nationalist opposition inside Israel to the principle of exchanging land for 
peace. This article sets out to explore this world view and its intellectual origins, exploring in the 
process how the use of sacred Judaic texts have become both the monopoly of religious-
nationalism and the template for politically inspired violence against those in Israel suspected of 
condoning territorial compromise. This article concludes that if the ideotheology of religious-
nationalists is to be assuaged, a religious discourse supporting territorial retrenchment has to 
become part of the political fabric of the centre-left in Israel. 
  
 
Introduction 
The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995, was the most 
public demonstration to date of active resistance by Israel’s religious-nationalists to Israeli 
concessions over the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the signing of the Oslo Accords. The 
concern of this paper, however, is not so much with groups and organisations associated with 
religious-nationalism in Israel such as Gush Emunim(1). Rather, it concentrates upon what can 
be termed the hermenuetics of ideo-theology - a term applied traditionally to the discovery of 
real but hidden meanings in sacred texts -that encapsulates the fusion of biblical 
precedence, halachic jurisprudence and the belief that Zionism as a largely secular ideology 
heralds the beginning of the messianic era. As Rabin’s assassin, Yigal Amir, declared in his 
testimony before a commision of enquiry into his slaying of Rabin, in the absence of 
a halakhic legitimacy bestowed by some rabbis condoning violence against the profane, his 
murder of the Israeli premier would have been illigitimate.(2) 
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This paper concentrates on the ideas underpinning this worldview, ideas that have 
increasingly come to accommodate and condone the use of violence as a pro-active means of 
forestalling any moves that may retard the messianic process. Certainly, recent surveys have 
suggested that religious-based opposition to the Oslo Accords, among both religious-
nationalists and more traditional haredi Jewish groups associated with non-Zionist parties has 
increased markedly since the election of Binyamin Netanyahu in May 1996. This development 
gives cause for concern, not least because differences over Zionism as an ideology have 
hitherto denied a consensual approach among religious Jews towards the issue of the 
occupied territories and the Palestinians.(3)  Accordingly, the hermeneutics of ideo-theology, 
as well as its physical symbols are important because they occupy a realm removed from the 
discourse of mainstream Zionism and, therefore, remain impervious to secular arguments 
regarding the sagacity of exchanging land for peace.(4) 
In exploring these issues, this paper concludes that if the ideo-theological cleavages in 
Israeli society are to be assuaged two parallel developments are required. Firstly, a religious 
discourse condoning territorial compromise and conciliation has to invade the space now 
dominated by the religious right. This is not to suggest extremist individuals can ever be 
convinced of the acumen of territorial compromise on theological grounds. The importance of 
such a dialogue lies, nonetheless in demonstrating to both Israelis and Palestinians that 
Judaism can, and indeed does, accommodate the demands of territorial compromise. 
Secondly, the centre-left in Israel, largely associated with secular, middle class Israelis of 
Ashkenazim origin, has to engage seriously in an ideo-theological discourse. This has to go 
beyond the mere symbols of Judaic piety, such as the inclusion of dovish rabbis as part of their 
political community. Rather, it has to be inclusive of religious-Zionism, willing to embrace its 
central tenets at both cultural and political levels. Failure to engage ideo-theology as a 
bridging identity to other groups in Israeli politics can only reinforce the current atavistic 
monopoly over hermenuetical interpretation exercised by religious-nationalists towards the 
peace process. The implications of such a development, of what Professor Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz once termed ‘Judeo-fascism’ remaining unchallenged, would indeed be onerous for 
the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. 
 
The Development of Ideo-theology 
The conviction that Zionism was the necessary precursor to what religous-nationalists 
beleived was the arrival of the messianic era found a particular resonance after 1967. The 
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capture of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the biblical heart of Eretz Y’Israel against 
apparently overwhelming odds soon acquired messianic overtones. Gush Emunim for example 
saw the war as deliverance of Eretz Y’Israel from what were termed the Sitra Achra, the evil 
side. In particular, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, the son of Rabbi Avraham Kook, placed Israel’s 
military triumph within the continuing evolution of the messianic era. His vision encompassed 
a preordained Jewish right to settle the newly captured territories, a process that was 
encouraged by Rabbi Zvi Kook among the students of the Yeshivat Merkaz Harav in Jerusalem. 
They were to spearhead the early settlement drives, leading to the establishment of such 
settlements such as Kiryat Arba next to Hebron.(5)  Zvi Kook used the ideas of his father to 
add theological legitimacy to the use of force in order to achieve and maintain the unity 
of Eretz Y’Israel. These ideas found a receptive audience among the wider religious right, 
offering as they did a carte blanche that divorced settlement activity from any moral or 
humanistic constraints. 
Indeed, the real impact of the religious right was to redefine the normative character of 
Zionism. While never a single cohesive ideology, Zionism was nonetheless an amalgam of 
ideas drawn from Jewish philosophy, history, and religion on the one hand, and fused with the 
universal values of freedom, democracy, and justice for its Jewish citizens, values identified 
with Western civilisation. While the period 1948-67 never saw the complete synthesis of 
these ideas, close association with universal values marked the development of 
an Israeli, rather than a Jewish identity. The June 1967 marked a watershed in this proces with 
the affirmation of particular Jewish, rather than universal values, in determining the character 
of the State of Israel.(6)  These particularist values increasingly influenced the political agenda 
in Israel after 1967, a process accelerated by the election of the first Likud led coalition 
government under Menachem Begin in 1977.(7) 
This also led the religious-right, influenced by the teachings of Rabbi Zvi Kook, to reject the 
theory of normalisation outlined by Herzl and other classical Zionist thinkers. In this respect, 
the October War of 1973 was of particular significance. If the June Six Day war was 
interpreted as signifying divine intervention in hastening the process of redemption, the Yom 
Kippur War signified the continued rejection by Gentiles of the Jews as a people, and an 
attempt to undermine the messianic age into which Jews as a people had now passed. 
Maintaining the integrity of the Eretz Y’Israel remained the supreme goal of religious-
nationalists and formed the core component of their ideo-theology. Clear reference was made 
to the covenant made between God and Abraham regarding the land as an “everlasting 
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possession”, a promise that is repeated by God, according to the book of Genesis to Abraham’s 
son Isaac and to his son Jacob.(8)  As long as successive Israeli governments -albeit on 
security grounds- continued to value Jewish control over the territories captured in 1967, a 
clear symbiosis of objectives existed with religious-nationalism. As such, submitting to the 
secular authority of the Jewish State posed little real difficulty. Nonetheless, by regarding the 
land as central to the redemptive process of the Jewish people, it followed that any attempt to 
trade land for peace usurped the will of God, and therefore, would be opposed. This position 
brought to the fore the centrality of Halacha, the doctrine, rules, and laws of Judaism that 
through the centuries, had been codified into juridical law. 
Yet traditionally, Halacha has had little to say regarding the sanctity of land, but rather 
concerns itself with the moral behaviour of Jews, both as individuals and as communities. 
Indeed, the imposition of violent sanctions against transgressors had been limited to actions 
of “idolatry, incestuous relationships, and the shedding of blood”.(9)  By using a process of 
anological reasoning Rabbi Zvi Kook was to apply the actions of idolatry to a wider political 
setting by invoking Pikuach Nefesh, a term that usurps the dictates of halakha if threats to life 
are to be averted. Accordingly, relinquishing land deemed holy not only fell under the remit of 
idolatry, but increased the danger to the Jewish people as a nation as territory of strategic 
worth was ceded to the Arabs. Territorial retrenchment therefore fell outside the remit 
ofpikuach nefesh since withdrawal would, from their perspective, not entail the saving of 
Jewish life. The whole issue of pikuach nefesh became increasingly salient to the actions of the 
religious-nationalists as they attempted to resist the implementation of the Oslo Accords by 
the government of Yitzhak Rabin. 
While by no means characteristic of the majority of rabbis associated with Israel’s 
religious-right, the language used to oppose territorial retrenchment was broad enough in its 
conceptual base to accommodate extreme acts. In the aftermath of Rabin’s death it emerged 
that two influential West Bank rabbis, Dov Lior and Nahum Rabinovich had issued a religious 
edict, declaring the Israeli premier to be a rodef. Under halachic law it is permissible to kill 
a rodef or persuer if there exists clear evidence that life is endangered. Again, while this ruling 
originated within the context of Jewish communal life, there existed an all too obvious 
correlation with the idea of pikuach nefesh. As such, this edict further redefined the limits of 
opposition to justify violent acts.(10)  By condoning the removal of Rabin, they were saving 
Jewish lives while continuing to redeem the land. Moreover, it became clear that in opposing 
the policies of Rabin’s government, ideo-theology had, among the more radical elements of 
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the religious-right, encompassed the notion of delegitimizing Rabin as a Jew. The emergence 
of such a trend was of significance precisely because from a religious perspective, it removed 
the veil of Judaic legitimacy from Rabin, thus placing him in a gentile world that was never to 
be trusted. The placards displaying Rabin variously in Nazi regalia or swathed in a kiffeyeh at 
right-wing demonstrations were the more visible aspects of this process. 
The sentiments expressed by the activist are the theological legacy of the late Rabbi Meir 
Kahane, the most radical of thinkers among right-wing religious opinion. Kahane took issue 
with the prevailing view among the religious-nationalists concerning Zionism as the 
necessary precursor to the messianic era. In a little read essay, Hillul Hashem, published in 
1976 Kahane maintained that the Jewish State was established not because of the 
righteousness of the Zionist cause, but rather because God could nolonger tolerate the 
continued persecution of his chosen people by Gentiles. Thus Israel was created by God as a 
punishment to the Gentiles, not a reward to the Jews. But this also led Kahane to conclude that 
the new born State was virtuous not because Zionists were a pious people -clearly they were 
not- but because of what a Jewish State “inflicts upon the Gentiles”.(11) 
Building upon this unique interpretation of historical events, Kahanism reinterpreted 
the halachic concepts of hillul hashem, and kiddush hashem, placing them within an extreme 
nationalist milieu. The former refers to the humiliation suffered by God when the Jews, 
irrespective of moral behaviour and religious adherence, are subject to repression. 
Conversely, when the Jews are strong, God’s power is revealed and his name sanctified -
 kiddush hashem. This was a radical departure from accepted orthodoxy surrounding a term 
that condoned martyrdom as the ultimate act in sanctifying God’s name. Instead, Kahanism 
saw sanctification of God’s name in the very act of killing those opposed to the Jewish people. 
As Kahane went on to explain kiddush hashem now represented ‘A Jewish fist in the face of an 
astonished Gentile world that had not seen it for two millennia, this is Kiddush Hashem.’(12)  
In a very real sense, Kahanism views violence as a cleansing process, one that has set the 
Jewish people free from the persecution and servitude of the diaspora. Kahanism consciously 
adopted a metahistorical approach which applied the term amalekh to describe all enemies, 
past, present, and future of the Jewish people. The amalekh were a biblical tribe whose 
destruction was demanded of the Israelites by God according to the Torah(13). As such the 
term was applied by Kahane to include all enemies of the Jewish people in general, and the 
Palestinians in particular. Therefore, if God’s name is to be sanctified, it is incumbent upon the 
Jews to destroy the amalekh, thus ushering in the true messianic era. 
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Such sentiment nonetheless underlined that concessions over territory threatened the 
religious-right and their explanation of what it actually meant to be an Israeli. In this respect, 
the language of the religious-right was crucial in creating an environment that not only 
condoned active civil disobedience, but, through the prism of its ideo-theology, sanctified 
recourse to violence. 
 
Ideo-theology: From Civil Disobedience to Violence 
The signing of the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993, brought in its wake an increased 
propensity for the religious-right, organised into extra-parliamentary opposition groups, to 
engage increasingly in acts of civil disobedience. The Accords presented religious-nationalists 
with the stark choice between recognising the temporal authority of a recidivist state, or 
active opposition based upon the logic of their ideo-theology. 
The ideas surrounding hillul hashem had a particular resonance among the settlers of 
Kiryat Arba, a settlement overlooking Hebron and renowned for the militant activism of some 
of its membersContinued tension between Jew and Arab in Hebron was equated with the 
metahistorical struggle against the amalekh, a confrontation that Kahanist logic embraced if 
God’s glory was to be redeemed; kiddush hashem.The massacre of 29 Palestinians by Baruch 
Goldstein was therefore entirely consonant with the most radical interpretation of Kahanist 
ideo-theology. The community of Kiryat Arba not only felt itself threatened in a physical sense 
by the overwhelming Palestinian presence in Hebron, but also by the spiritual atrophy of a 
secular State that had negated the redemptive process. Indeed, it was reported that on 24 
February 1994, on the eve of the festival of Purim, a crowd of Palestinians approached the 
Tomb shouting “Itbah al-yahud”, death to the Jews, an incident thought to have provoked 
Goldstein’s bloody actions. The massacre has to be understood, therefore, within the context 
of a Kahanist interpretation of hillul hashem , and not solely as a brazen attempt to destroy the 
peace process.(14) 
The clarion call to resist the authority of the secular state remained, nonetheless, a constant 
theme among the religious right. From being the spiritual and territorial vanguard of 
settlement -the religious heirs to a pioneering tradition- the religious-right saw their chimera 
of redemption sacrificed to the amalekh on the alter of political expediency. Influenced by an 
ideo-theology that refuted normative values in dealing with the Israel-Palestine dispute, the 
actions of Yigal Amir on 4 November 1995, were in a very real sense pre-ordained. 
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Ideo-theology and Netanyahu 
The election of Netanyahu to office in May 1996, not suprisingly, was welcomed by the 
religious right in Israel. His electoral triumph, while narrow, has been seen as a palliative to 
the secular nemesis that threatened the integrity of Eretz Y’Israel. While settlers remain 
apprehensive regarding the scope of future Israeli withdrawals on the West Bank, 
Netanyahu’s evident distaste for wholesale territorial concessions, visibly demonstrated in 
the virtual demise of the Oslo process, has done much to assuage their anger.(15)  
This dissipation of anger is more than just the personna of ‘Bibi’ himself. It is also a 
reflection of the continuing right-wing shift in the position of the National Religious Party 
(NRP), the embodiment since the late 1960s of the religious-nationalist agenda. Indeed, many 
of its members, both inside the Knesset and outside, enjoy close association with Gush 
Emunim. The recent death of veteran party leader Zevulen Hammer has brought to the fore 
Rabbi Yitzhak Levy. As founder of the extreme Matzad faction within the NRP, Levy has 
previously made clear his opposition to allowing Arab Knesset members the right to vote on 
the Oslo accords, and has favoured the forced ‘repatriation’ of Palestinians in the occupied 
territories to other Arab states. 
This perceptable shift by the NRP to the right has been allied with a greater emphasis 
placed by the leadership towards consulting rabbis over issues of politcal, as well as religous 
importance. As such, concern has been raised over the position of former Sephardi Chief 
Rabbi, Mordechai Eliahu, a close confidant of Levy whose invocation of pikuakh nefesh in 
opposing territorial retrenchment form the occupied territories has casued considerable 
disquiet. Two explanations can be given to explain the NRP’s position. The first involves naked 
political opportunism; the fact that Levy is the first Jew of Oriental origin to head the NRP 
suggests that he can appeal to those haredim loyal to SHAS, the main orthodox party of the 
Oriental Jewish community; the second reason is that evidence exists to suggest opinion 
among both Oriental and Ashkenazi haredi communities is resolutely opposed to Oslo. They 
accept the religious-nationalist argument that retrenchment from the territories has not 
resulted in pikuah nefesh -the saving of Jewish lives- and that further Israeli withdrawal from 
the territories should be discontinued. This is not to suggest that the haredim per se have 
changed their position which regards Zionism as antitheticalc to the realisation of the 
messianic age. Rather, it is to suggest that greater Judaic piety on the part of the NRP, coupled 
with the belief that Palestinians remain bent on destroying the Jews, has created a synergy of 
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political interest in the Knesset among and between members of these two distinct religis 
traditions that is inimical to advancement further of the peace process.(16)  
This merger of two previously distinct religious traditions has been apparent for some 
time. One commentator of Israel’s internal political milieu highlighted the extent to which the 
NRP has begun to discard its previous tolerance of Israel’s predominantly secular culture in 
favour of a rejectionist stance that eschews modernity in favour of a political and social order 
based upon halakha. It was noted that if theharedim had begun to be influenced by the ideo-
theology of religious-nationalism, then religious-nationalists represented by the NRP had 
been exposed to ‘haredization’.(17)  Certainly, comments by Levy that Israel’s political system 
be run in accordance with halakha appeals to the finite world view of the haredim, a view 
anathema to the mainly secular outlook held by most Israelis. 
 
Countering Religious Nationalism 
There are those who refute the validity of halacha in determining any discourse among a 
largely secular populace. Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, has 
dismissed halacha on historical grounds, the claim being that it emerged as a means of 
ensuring social and communal cohesion of Jews following their dispersion in approximately 
70AD. Having emerged as a response to the conditions of Jews in the diaspora, halacha is, 
according to Benvenisti, irrelevant to questions regarding the sanctity of land because it never 
referred to a given territory inhabited by the Jews as a cohesive nation.(18)  While a rational 
argument in a chronological sense, this overtly secular view ignores the reality of a situation 
where halacha has come to exert enormous influence as a commentary on 
the Torah and Talmud regarding the absolute spiritual value of territory. Many secular Israelis 
point to the extreme form of proportional representation that has led to a situation in which 
religious-nationalists and haredi political groupings have changed the normative basis of 
Israel’s political discourse. Accordingly, they argue that the centre-left should agitate for a 
clear separation between the temporal and spiritual in Israeli political life if the 
developing kulturkampf within Israeli society is not to manifest itself in more extreme 
ways.(19)  While such sentiment is supported widely among some sections of Israeli society 
two main impediments, one political, one social, negate any such seperation. Politcally, the 
demands of building and maintaining a coalition government negate the introduction of a law 
inimical to the worldview of haredi parties and NRP alike. Secondly, it is not at all clear that 
even if a coalition government could coalesce around laws seperating religion from state, it 
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would actually enjoy broad popular appeal. The rigid distinction between secular and 
religious is not an accurate reflection of attitudes towards religion among Israelis. It has been 
estimated that up to 40 percent prefer the epithet ‘traditional’, a term that encompasses a 
benign attitude towards Judaism as a religion, but falls short of strict observance of Jewish 
rituals.(20)  In this respect, religion has come to play an increasingly important part in 
moving the idea of Israeli national identity beyond its original ethnic 
template. Halacha remains therefore a crucial element in challenging the ideo-theology of the 
religious-right, demonstrating that the well-being of the people takes precedent over the 
sanctity of the land. 
Questioning the use of pikuach nefesh in this context is important because it removes the 
sanctity of the land as an absolute value from the redemption for the Jewish people and places 
the latter on a higher plane. This view was also put forcefully by Rabbi Yehuda Amital, one-
time member of Gush Emunim whose maximalist views regarding the sanctity of the land 
underwent a “Road to Damascus” conversion following the shock registered at the scale of 
Israel’s casualties during the Lebanon war.(21)  Amital also raised his concern that the use 
of halacha as a prism to interpret reality remained potentially explosive, particularly among 
those who viewed it as an absolute set of truths, removed from a particular historical and 
social context. 
Amital now heads Meimad (Dimension) , a religious nationalist party formed in 1988 from 
former members of the NRP disenchanted with its close association with Gush Emunim. Amital 
declared recently that it was the duty of Meimad ‘to remind the general public as well as the 
religious public that not all the religious [Zionists] have adopted the extremist views of the 
religious parties’.(22)  This reference to extremist views refers not only to the NRP position 
over the occupied territories but also the process of atomisation that is seen to remove the 
party and its constituency from mainstream Israeli society.(23)  
Problematic for Meimad until now has been the perception that its desire to engage in a 
critical dialogue with a secular constituency has undermined a sustained critique of a 
modernity deemed antithetical to the demands of Judaic probity. It is now widely recognised 
that if Meimad is to accrue wider political support at least among Orthodox Jews, a clear 
distinction has to be made between the application ofhalakha in Israel’s domestic affairs, and 
its application in justifying territorial retrenchment. As one commentator 
of Meimad’s renewed vibrancy noted: 
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After Rabin’s murder, even those who in principle would prefer to join a non-religious 
party are likely to want moderate religious representatives in the Knesset, to prove to the 
public at large we[religious-Zionists] are not of all the NRP’s ilk. On the other hand, religious 
Jews who support the peace process remain uninvited guests on the left. Much depends on 
Meimad’s platform. But this time, an appeal to vote for Meimad will fall on more receptive 
ears.(24)  
Meimad activists have begun to work towards this end. Some have become involved in an 
orthodox group called Yesodot (Foundations) which aims to impart democratic values to 
students of all ages in religious-Zionist schools by demonstrating that halakhic jurisprudence 
and democracy are complimentary. Accordingly, emphasis is placed upon the study of 
interpretations of sacred Judaic texts and the veracity of applying such interpretations to the 
present context of Israeli politics.(25) One of the main political pillars of Meimad, that Eretz 
Yisrael is the land promised to the Jewish people by God in perpetuity would appear inimical 
to trading land for peace. Such ‘absolutism’ however, is conditioned by the value placed 
by Meimad on the preservation of life, including the avoidence of war and bloodshed, 
according to the Torah. Accordingly, life is placed above land, leading to a more liberal 
interpretation of pikuach nefesh that places the safety of the people of Israel and the unity of 
the state above total control of the land. The religious scholar and peace campaigner Avi 
Ravitsky summed up this argument when he noted the following: 
I believe there is another face to Judaism; when peace and the sanctity of human life and 
the dignity of the human being comes prior to the iontegrity of the land, I do not give back the 
land metaphysically, but politcally we have to live here side by side [with the Palestinians]. I 
do not want to kill and I do not want to be killed in the name of the Torah . I believe that some 
orthodox radical Jews are corrupting the use of the Torah with regard to the peace process. 
(26)  
If Meimad is to act as an effective foil to the dominant ideotheology of the religious-right 
however, much may depend on making common cause with religious peace organisations 
such as Netivot Shalom/Oz ve Shalom (Paths to peace/Courage and Peace). While not denying 
that the Jews have a covenant with God regarding ahistorical possession of the land, Oz ve 
Shalom argue, however, that there exists a biblical precedent for the ceding of land in 
exchange for peace. It is mentioned in Genesis that Abraham gave land to the shepherds of Lot 
in settling a dispute over grazing rights, a precedent that according to David Hall-Cathala 
suggests that, “divine promise cannot be equated with the actual ownership of the land”.(27)  
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Given the shifting nature of the borders that marked the Hebrew Kingdoms of David and 
Soloman, Netivot Shalom/Oz Ve Shalom have concluded that it is impossible for settler groups 
to claim sanctity over a defined territory. 
Accordingly, Netivot Shalom/Oz ve Shalom have placed emphasis on universal values to be 
found in Judaism, including the belief that all “human beings were created in God’s image and 
are worthy of being treated with dignity, respect, and compassion”.(28)  It follows from this 
that what sanctifies any territorial space is not the land itself, but rather the quality of a 
society built upon that land and the treatment of its population.. The enforced slavery of the 
Children of Israel as described in the book of Genesis is cited as proof of God’s approbation 
when Jews failed to adhere to such strictures. If Israel is to fulfil the prophetic vision of being a 
“light onto the nations” it cannot continue to occupy or dehumanise another people.(29)  This 
contrasts sharply with the apocalyptic vision of the amalekh, while challenging the normative 
values represented by the hermenuetics of the religious-nationalism. 
Netivot Shalom members also deny that priority be given to halakha over the laws of the 
secular state. Indeed, they regard the two as immutable, with democratic ideals associated 
with the secular state clearly congruent with halakhic practice to be found in Jewish 
communities or Kehilot from the tenth century onwards. Kehilot developed internal 
leadership and institutions composed of elected officials that catered to the civil and social 
needs of their respective polities. This practice, while deriving every-day sovereignty from the 
people, gained legitimacy under continued inovations in halakhic jurisprudence. Laws or 
regulations passed by elected bodies within Kehilot assumed binding status on all members of 
the community, a position enforced by such laws acquiring the authority of din torah (Toranic 
law). According to Dr Lucien Lazar of Netivot Shalom, Israel in its present political 
configuration is, by definition a halakhic state, its democratic tradition based upon, and 
indivisible from, authority vested in freely elected representatives of the people. Lazar went 
on to note that, ‘Whosoever rises and preaches a doctrine of disobedience of a legitimate 
authority, on the grounds that such and such an order is in violation of halakha, is destroying 
with his own hands the basis of halakha and the sources of legitimate authority, and turning 
his back on the Jewish tradition.’(30)  
Such arguments are not new to Israeli politics, but their influence has remained secondary 
to a debate that has concentrated upon the strategic rational behind Israel’s control over the 
occupied territories. Even after the Shamgar Commission -set up to investigate the Hebron 
massacre- warned publicly of the potential for settlers and their supporters to engage in acts 
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of terror, concern in Israel remained centred on the strategic threat posed to the security of 
the state by the autonomy proposals, rather than countering the growing militancy among 
elements within the religious-nationalist camp.(31)  In July 1993, a symposium organised by 
the United States Institute for Peace on the Israel-Palestine conflict concluded that “more can 
be done in advancing peace in areas of conflict through work with religious bodies and 
communities”.(32)  While the conference was aimed at promoting interfaith dialogue between 
Jew and Muslim, Rabin’s assassination demonstrated that intra-faith dialogue among Israelis 
had to be accorded at least equal importance. 
 
Conclusion 
Religious-nationalism, quiescent in the immediate aftermath of Rabin’s death remains a 
potent force that, however unintentional, can only have drawn support from the carnage 
visited upon Israel’s streets throughout February and March 1996. Such attacks demonstrated 
to a community whose agenda remained mortgaged to retention of the West Bank and Gaza 
that only territorial entrenchment could ensurepikuach nefesh. If moves towards a regional 
settlement are to progress forward, it remains incumbent upon the centre-left in Israel at 
least to engage the ideo-theology of religious-nationalism on its terms, using its vocabulary. 
Demonising religious-nationalists, both as individuals and groups, cannot but fail to 
undermine their beliefs or heal at least some of the cleavages in Israeli society. One 
commentator noted somewhat bitterly that the present Labour alignment leader, Ehud Barak, 
‘misses every opportunity to speak about peace in Jewish terms’.(33) Debating whose 
Judaism, whose interpretations of sacred texts, whose values should apply, a discourse 
conducted openly at a national level, has to be therefore part of a broader political panacea if 
the ideo-theology of religious-nationalism is not to become Israel’s nemesis. 
This does question the wisdom of those located primarily among Israel’s centre-left who 
seek a clear separation between religion and the state. It suggests that a theocratic tradition 
has to become an enduring feature of centre-left’s political culture. But the fact that both 
the Torah and Halakah can accommodate and actively promote reconciliation between 
peoples -ve-ahavta la’ger- and in the process become a bridging identity among large sections 
of Israeli society does suggest that a humane Judaism, firmly located within the wider Zionist 
debate, can provide a constructive force for change both inside Israel, and in the broader 
context of Middle East politics. As one noted observer of Israel’s political scene remarked, ‘If 
[ideo-theology] combated in its own terms, with interpretations of Jewish tradition that make 
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Judaism the friend of democracy, pluralism and life over land - not the enemy of those values - 
then Judaism can still save the Jewish State.’(34)  
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